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PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS: THERE’S NO PUBLIC
BENEFIT TO BREACHING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Oderah Nwaeze *
INTRODUCTION
During the spring and summer of 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19
pandemic, the United States witnessed large, public protests and activism
reminiscent of the 1950s and 60s. Following the death of George Floyd, a Black
man, at the hands of Minneapolis police, the American public once again
mobilized to fight the ills and inequities of racism and discrimination. A
significant number of nonprofit organizations and government departments have
been created to resolve the social and political issues that plague Americans.
Even Corporate America has been called to act, given that seventy percent of
consumers are interested in the social justice efforts taken by the corporations
they patronize. 1 By the third quarter of 2020, plenty of companies answered the
call. For example, Bank of America and PNC Bank each have committed
$1 billion to address economic and racial inequality. Google’s parent Alphabet
pledged $12 million to further racial equality. Target Corp. has committed $10
million to civil rights organizations and 10,000 hours of consulting services to
small businesses owned by people of color. Comcast Corp. also announced that
it will allocate $75 million to organizations including the National Urban
League, the Equal Justice Initiative, and the NAACP, along with $25 million in
media over the next three years.
Recognizing that corporate activism could be inconsistent with the duty of
directors and officers to secure and retain value for the company, some
commentators have suggested that corporations committed to activism should
create or convert to a Public Benefit Corporation (“PBC”). While the core trait
of a PBC is that it must pursue public benefit, that charge is not superior to
directors’ and officers’ responsibility to generate and preserve value for the
company’s stockholders. Thus, while PBCs provide legal cover for corporate
activism, corporate management must weigh that interest against the obligation

*
Oderah C. Nwaeze is a trial lawyer, at Duane Morris LLP, with significant experience litigating
complex corporate and commercial matters, including corporate governance actions; statutory actions arising
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1
Consumers Expect the Brands They Support to be Socially Responsible, Business Wire (Oct. 2, 2019,
12:09 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191002005697/en/Consumers-Expect-BrandsSupport-Socially-Responsible.

NWAEZE_4.13.21

26

4/15/2021 11:00 AM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 8

to satisfy traditional fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty, as well as the
obligation to avoid waste. This balance is not difficult to strike; it simply requires
that directors and officers carefully evaluate the anticipated conduct to ensure
the action considered appears likely to provide corporate benefit, reasonable for
the resources expended. As part of that due diligence process, directors and
officers also must make certain any transaction that benefits a director or officer
is entirely fair to the corporation. Furthermore, directors and officers must
ensure that the resources committed to a social cause are reasonable given the
company’s size and value, as well as the benefits of the philanthropy.

WHAT IS A PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION?
On August 1, 2013, the Delaware legislature amended the Delaware General
Corporation Law (“DGCL”) to add subchapter XV (DGCL §§ 361 to 368, the
“PBC Statutes”), which allows corporations to be formed as or converted to a
PBC. In order to convert to a PBC, however, an established Delaware
corporation must first receive the approval of at least 90% of the outstanding
shares of each class of stock of such corporation.
While corporate management traditionally has a fiduciary duty to maximize
stockholder value in making decisions, directors and officers of a PBC must
balance those duties with obligations to (1) pursue one or more Public Benefits
identified in its certificate of incorporation; and (2) operate in a manner that
considers the interests of those materially affected by the company’s conduct.
According to DGCL § 362(b), a “Public Benefit” is the positive effect or
reduction of negative effects on one or more groups (other than stockholders in
their capacities as stockholders). The PBC Statutes contemplate a company’s
Public Benefit may be related to artistic, charitable, cultural, economic,
educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific, or
technological endeavors. PBCs also must provide stockholders with a report
every other year that describes the PBC’s progress towards its Public Benefit
goals. 2
In managing and controlling a company’s business and affairs, directors and
officers of a Delaware corporation owe, to their corporation and its stockholders,
the obligations to act with due care and loyalty. 3 Although emphasized, the
obligation to pursue Public Benefit does not have priority over other duties

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2019).
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–
09 (Del. 2009) (explicitly holding that corporate officers owe the fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty).
2
3
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owed. And, the PBC statutes were drafted to avoid the creation of other statutory
benefits based on a person’s interest in a PBC. 4 Stockholders could thus file an
action asserting that directors and officers failed to exercise due care or loyalty
while seeking to accomplish some Public Benefit. 5 Hence, directors and officers
must balance stockholders’ pecuniary interests with the Public Benefit(s)
described in the certificate of incorporation and the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct.

Even PBCs Must Take Care Not to Cause Harm
At its core, due care mandates that directors act on an informed basis and
consider all material information reasonably available. 6 A company’s board and
officers are expected to have reasonable knowledge of the company’s business,
obtain credible information with respect to corporate actions, and anticipate and
understand the consequences of each decision or transaction. 7 But, they will not
be penalized for a simple error in judgment “if the decision appeared reasonable
at the time the decision was made.” 8 A breach of the duty of care exists only if
the directors and officers acted with gross negligence, meaning that their conduct
“constitutes reckless indifference or actions that are without the bounds of
reason.” 9
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the
defendant directors breached their duty of care by approving a transaction during
a two-hour board meeting, after only relying on the board chairman’s twentyminute presentation. 10 Among the board’s failings were that it did nothing to
understand the value of the company it decided to sell, it did not conduct a
market analysis, and it refused to meaningfully review the contracts governing
the transaction. 11 Similarly, in Cede v. Technicolor, the board was found to have
breached the duty of care by failing to conduct a pre or post-transaction market
test without having a rational business basis for not doing so. 12 Given the
holdings in Van Gorkom and Cede, corporate management must make sure to

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (2019).
Id. § 367.
6
See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
259 (Del. 2000).
7
See Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
8
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964).
9
Zucker v. Hassell, 2016 WL 7011351, at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2016), aff’d, 165 A.3d 288 (Del. 2017).
10
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 880 (Del. 1985).
11
See id.
12
Cede, 634 A.2d at 369.
4
5
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adequately deliberate and investigate corporate action related to the purpose of
Public Benefit, to ensure that it would not result in harm to the company.
As mentioned above, Section 367 of the DGCL allows a stockholder to bring
an action where the PBC’s management has failed to balance Public Benefit with
traditional obligations. Among those obligations is to generate and preserve
value for the PBC and its stockholders. Thus, directors or officers of a PBC
expose themselves to liability by approving conduct for the Public Benefit that
caused the PBC to suffer unreasonable losses. As required by the duty of care,
corporate management must have reasonable knowledge of the company’s
business such that they avoid action that interferes with the PBC’s ability to
generate revenue.
Loyalty to Public Benefit and to the Stockholder
Corporate management also must adhere to the duty of loyalty, which
assumes that they affirmatively protect the interests of the corporation and
refrain taking any self-interested actions that cause injury to the company they
serve. The duty of loyalty further mandates that the best interest of a corporation
and its stockholders takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director
or officer and not shared by the stockholders generally. 13 For example, in Boyer
v. Wilmington Materials, the Court of Chancery held that a company’s fiveperson board breached the duty of loyalty when it agreed to sell substantially all
of the corporation’s assets at an unfair price reached through an unfair process
to a company owned by three of the board members, and in which the other two
directors would own shares after the transaction. 14 Similarly, in a post-trial
decision in Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, the court held that a director/officer
breached the duty of loyalty by approving an initial public offering and a failed
corporate restructuring that would result in large cash bonuses for himself. 15
Not only did the officer/director defendant fail to prove that his $3 million bonus
was fair to the corporation, but he also could not demonstrate that the process
through which it was awarded was entirely fair to the company. 16
Given the boundaries set by the duty of loyalty, directors and officers must
be careful to understand the corporation’s Public Benefit activities, including
whether any directors or officers stand to gain materially. If any director or
officer will benefit from the Public Benefit conduct, the company’s decision13
14
15
16

See id. at 361; see also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1175–76 (Del. 1995).
Boyer v. Wilmington Materials, Inc., 754 A.2d 881, 885 (Del. Ch. 1999).
Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, 2007 WL 2813789, at 1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2007).
Id. at 16.
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makers must confirm that the action or transaction being contemplated is fair to
the corporation and its stockholders. Although evaluating fairness involves a
fact-intensive analysis, activism that personally benefits directors and officers
likely will not be considered fair unless it confers some significant, tangible
benefit to the corporation other than the public’s general approval of the
corporate conduct.
Corporate Activism Is Possible Without Waste
Finally, directors and officers of PBCs must be mindful of corporate waste,
which exists where the company engaged in an exchange or transaction that was
“so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.” 17 A waste
claim exists “where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate
assets.” 18
The case Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson is instructive. There, a
company’s stockholders filed a derivative lawsuit asserting that the
corporation’s losses were the result of corporate waste in the form of a
significant charitable donation. 19 The Court of Chancery held that since the
corporation’s charitable donation was less than the federal tax deduction limit of
five percent of the company’s income, it did not constitute waste because it could
be written off. 20 Similarly, in Kahn v. Sullivan, the Delaware Supreme Court
refused to find that a board’s decision to fund the construction and establishment
of an art museum constituted a waste of corporate assets, because the corporate
resources committed were reasonable considering the corporation’s value,
annual revenue and profits, and tax benefits. 21 Furthermore, the corporation
received economic benefit from being able to use the museum to promote its
business. 22
The lesson for PBCs is clear. They should be careful that their budgets and
resources are allocated in a manner that does not unreasonably prioritize Public
Benefit efforts to the detriment of the PBC. Stated differently, resources
earmarked for Public Benefit must be reasonable given the PBC’s size, assets,
revenue, and value.

17
18
19
20
21
22

Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
Id.; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006).
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 399–400 (Del. Ch. 1969).
Id. at 405-406.
See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991).
See id. at 62.
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Thankfully, It Is Harder to be Sued for Doing “Good”
As noted above, the PBC Statutes require corporate management to balance
Public Benefit, the company’s impact on the community, and traditional
fiduciary obligations. To establish a claim against directors or officers of a PBC,
an eligible stockholder must assert facts indicating that corporate management
failed to or did not adequately pursue one of these three interests. The
stockholder might also allege, despite business practices that typically prioritize
all three interests, that the company or its management failed to consider one or
more of the interests with respect to a specific transaction or series of
transactions. However, given the relative newness of this requirement to balance
interests and the associated judgment calls that must be made, the drafters of the
PBC Statutes wisely made it difficult for a stockholder to bring individual or
derivative claims. The stockholder must either own (1) two percent of the
corporation’s outstanding shares, or, if the corporation is publicly traded, (2) the
lesser of two percent of its outstanding shares or shares equaling at least
$2,000,000 in market value. 23

23

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2019).

